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Abstract
Background: Since 1991, there has been a series of reforms of the English National Health Service (NHS) entailing
an increasing separation between the commissioners of services and a widening range of public and independent
sector providers able to compete for contracts to provide services to NHS patients. We examine the extent to
which local commissioners had adopted a market-oriented (transactional) model of commissioning of care for
people with long term conditions several years into the latest period of market-oriented reform. The paper also
considers the factors that may have inhibited or supported market-oriented behaviour, including the presence of
conditions conducive to a health care quasi-market.
Methods: We studied the commissioning of services for people with three long term conditions - diabetes, stroke
and dementia - in three English primary care trust (PCT) areas over two years (2010-12). We took a broadly
ethnographic approach to understanding the day-to-day practice of commissioning. Data were collected through
interviews, observation of meetings and from documents.
Results: In contrast to a transactional, market-related approach organised around commissioner choice of provider
and associated contracting, commissioning was largely relational, based on trust and collaboration with incumbent
providers. There was limited sign of commissioners significantly challenging providers, changing providers, or
decommissioning services.
In none of the service areas were all the conditions for a well functioning quasi-market in health care in place.
Choice of provider was generally absent or limited; information on demand and resource requirements was highly
imperfect; motivations were complex; and transaction costs uncertain, but likely to be high. It was difficult to divide
care into neat units for contracting purposes. As a result, it is scarcely surprising that commissioning practice in
relation to all six commissioning developments was dominated by a relational approach.
Conclusions: Our findings challenge the notion of a strict separation of commissioners and providers, and instead
demonstrate the adaptive persistence of relational commissioning based on continuity of provision, trust and
interdependence between commissioners and providers, at least for services for people with long-term conditions.
Introduction
Much research on commissioning in the National
Health Service (NHS) examines the organisation of
commissioning, and in particular, contracting (see paper
by Hughes et al in this supplement [1]). Little attention
has been paid to the day-to-day work of commissioning,
including all the other tasks which support contracting,
especially in relation to services for people with long
term conditions. We therefore undertook a two year
study (2010-2012) of the local commissioning of health
care in three ‘commissioning communities’, each centred
on an English NHS primary care trust (PCT). We focused
on services for people with three long term conditions:
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diabetes, stroke and dementia [2]. The overall aim of the
project was to explore how NHS commissioning could be
enacted to improve care for people living with long-term
conditions. The current analysis examines the extent to
which commissioners had adopted a market-oriented
(transactional) model of commissioning rather than the
relational approach [1,3,4] that marked NHS community
health services in the 1990s [5]. The paper also considers
the factors that may have inhibited or supported market-
oriented behaviour, including the presence of conditions
conducive to a health care quasi-market.
Commissioning in the English NHS quasi-market
Since 1991, the NHS in England has been organised around
a separation between ‘commissioners’ (purchasers) and
‘providers’ of services. This separation is a defining charac-
teristic of the so called NHS ‘quasi-market’ (‘quasi’ in that
commissioners generally act on behalf of patients) in which
public or independent providers of health care may com-
pete for contracts from purchasers who are charged with
securing services for their local population. Increasingly,
too, there is scope for patient-initiated commissioning
through choice of place of elective care and individual
patient budgets. The theory is that competition (or the
threat of competition) between suppliers of care will lead to
more responsive, effective and efficient services than would
occur if NHS services remained local monopolies (see the
paper by Allen in this supplement for further detail [6]).
Following Williamson [3], Bartlett and Le Grand [7]
posit a number of conditions that need to be satisfied
for a quasi-market to function well in terms of effi-
ciency, responsiveness, choice and equity (Table 1). This
paper investigates the extent to which these were pre-
sent at local level in relation to commissioning services
for people with three long term conditions.
One of the most influential conceptualisations of
health care commissioning, used by the English Depart-
ment of Health to set out what is expected of NHS
commissioners [8], distinguishes ‘commissioning’ from
simple purchasing and/or contracting, suggesting that it
has a more strategic and proactive intent [9]. This has
been explained by Woodin as follows:
‘A commissioner decides which services or health care
interventions should be provided, who should provide
them and how they should be paid for, and works
closely with the provider implementing changes. A
purchaser buys what is on offer or reimburses the
provider on the basis of usage.’ [10] (p203)
The framework for putting this intent into practice
has been described in terms of an annual ‘commission-
ing cycle’, beginning with assessing the needs of the
population, then planning services, contracting with pro-
viders, monitoring services and revising the previous
plans, before embarking on another round of needs
assessment [9].
This separation of commissioning from provision func-
tions provides a structure which allows choice between
alternative providers on the basis of cost and value, and
the possibility of loss of contract to act as an encourage-
ment to providers to maintain and improve the quality
and appropriateness of services. However, there is no
inherent connection between having a distinct commis-
sioning function in a system and the existence of supplier
competition, though the two are often confused in debate.
Mays and Hand [11] identified various potential commis-
sioning functions which do not necessarily depend on the
operation of competition:
• a role in planning unhindered by responsibility for
managing health care institutions or protecting employ-
ment of staff;
• acting as an informed counterweight to professional
dominance of service specification and spending
patterns;
• clarifying providers’ costs;
• facilitating clear lines of public accountability for the
performance of providers and commissioners;
• making priority decisions more explicit to the public
and patients.
Policy context for the study
By the start of the research in March 2010, all the ele-
ments in the Labour Government ’s quasi-market
reforms [12,6] had been fully operational for about four
Table 1 Conditions which need to be satisfied for a quasi-market to work (adapted from Bartlett and Le Grand 1993)
competitiveness the quasi-market should be competitive on both sides (many purchasers, many providers)
information both providers and purchasers need access to accurate, independent information in order to monitor quality and minimise
opportunistic behaviour on the part of the provider
transaction
costs
(whether set-up or continuing) should be no higher than any cost savings generated by competition
motivation economic theory suggest that providers should be motivated by financial considerations, and purchasers by user interest
cream-
skimming
there should be no motivation for providers to pick and choose some patients over others on the base of cost or complexity of
treatment
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years and PCTs had been in place for almost a decade.
The majority of commissioning was carried out at local
level, by 152 PCTs with responsibility for spending
75-80% of the NHS budget. Within the constraints of
national strategy and targets, PCTs set local priorities,
specified standards of quality for local services and
could negotiate variations to the national standard ser-
vice contracts, sometimes working on behalf of consor-
tia of general practices under the ‘practice-based
commissioning’ scheme. Though prices for most acute
hospital services were fixed nationally based on Health
Resource Groups (HRGs - the English equivalent of
Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs)), other prices -
including those for care delivered by community provi-
ders - were negotiated locally. Commissioners were also
expected by the Department of Health to ‘stimulate’ the
local health care market to ensure that ‘adequate provi-
der choice’ existed [13].
The period of study was one of further major system
change following the election of the coalition govern-
ment in May 2010. The July 2010 NHS White Paper
Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS [14] was the
start of a tortuous legislative process leading towards a
gradual shift of local responsibility for commissioning
and for 60% of NHS resources to GP-led clinical com-
missioning groups (CCGs), fully implemented by April
2013. The other important contextual factor was a
severe constraint on NHS budgets in a time of increas-
ing demand [15].
Methods
The study consisted of case studies of three ‘commis-
sioning communities’, each centred on an English PCT,
but also including other organisations involved in plan-
ning or delivering care. We studied the commissioning
of health care for people with three long term condi-
tions over 22 months (April 2010 and January 2012),
taking a broadly ethnographic approach to understand-
ing the day-to-day practice of commissioning.
A set of quantitative metrics, summarising 200 indica-
tors drawn from the assessments by national agencies
and local operational and financial data, was used to
identify a group of ‘high performing’ PCTs which were
invited to participate in the study. Somerset (pop
525,000), Wirral (pop 309,000) and Calderdale (pop
203,000) agreed to take part, with the Calderdale site sub-
sequently expanded to include neighbouring Kirklees,
reflecting local collaborative commissioning.
We studied six commissioning developments (two in
each site). To allow comparison across sites, we exam-
ined an aspect of the commissioning of diabetes services
in all three sites. Each PCT then selected a condition for
which there was a local commissioning initiative:
dementia in Calderdale and Wirral, and stroke in
Somerset.
We gathered data through observing meetings (n=27),
semi-structured interviews (n=124), informal update
interviews (n=20) and analysis of documents (n=345).
Observations were used to analyse the practice of com-
missioning. Fieldwork involved PCT managers and clini-
cians, general practice-based commissioners, NHS trust
and NHS foundation trust senior managers and clini-
cians, and voluntary sector and local government repre-
sentatives involved in planning and purchasing care.
There were three components to the analysis of this
rich qualitative dataset, with the first two predominantly
inductive. First, we developed a thematic framework
from the data, informed by literature and guided by the
approach of Hammersley, Gomm and Foster [16] that
considered the processes and resources that appeared to
shape commissioning outputs. The five key processes
(driving change forward; addressing local people’s needs;
specifying services and agreeing contracts; measuring and
promoting service quality; and completing the commis-
sioning cycle with review) and five resources (people/
organisations, data, money, ideas and time) were used to
create a matrix used as a working tool for analysis.
Second, we wrote six working papers describing the com-
missioning practice in the six service areas being tracked,
which allowed us to then explore themes within the data,
and to compare practice within and across the sites. The
on-going process of updating, review and reworking both
elements of the analysis was made richer through invol-
vement of all members of the multi-disciplinary research
team, input from an external advisory group, and regular
checking of our emerging analysis with the sites. The
third element of our analysis, for the current paper, was
deductive, using data from the first two elements to see
whether the conditions for successful quasi-market rela-
tions (Table 1) were in place locally.
The study was approved by the Outer South-East Lon-
don NHS Research Ethics Committee and local NHS
Research Governance approval was gained in each site.
We agreed to reveal the names of each of our three
sites, but not identify individual respondents, so quota-
tions presented below are anonymised.
Results
We identify the extent to which each of Bartlett and Le
Grand’s [7] five conditions for a successful quasi-market
were in place (Table 1) by analysing the features of the
commissioning activity in each site (summarised in Addi-
tional file 1). Finally, we present a sixth theme, not explicitly
identified by Bartlett and Le Grand: the need to ‘parcel up’
service delivery into units for which specifications can be
written and contracts issued by commissioners.
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Competitiveness
According to Bartlett and Le Grand [7], an effective
quasi-market needs to be competitive on both sides; that
is, have many purchasers, and many providers, or at least
the scope for many providers to enter the market. Having
single purchasers buying from single providers risks a
‘too intimate’ (p21) relationship that risks hampering the
bargaining process. A market structure with many provi-
ders maintains quality and keeps costs down through the
threat of loss of business offered by (potential) competi-
tion. Since each PCT was a monopoly purchaser within a
geographical area for the services studied, we concentrate
on the extent of competition among providers.
In only one of the six service areas did we observe de-
commissioning of an old service occur as part of the pro-
cess of service re-modelling. In Wirral, GPs ‘with a Special
Interest’ (GPSIs) ceased to provide the diagnosis service
for dementia patients when the new Wirral Memory
Assessment Service was established (Additional file 1),
delivered by the local NHS trust providing mental health
care, with input from the Alzheimer’s Society. This shift in
provider in Wirral did not take place through a formal
process of competitive tendering and re-issue of contract.
Instead, it was made through negotiation, a feature of
commissioning that was common to all six service areas,
with commissioners reluctant to destabilise the local
health economy by suddenly withdrawing income from
providers.
This approach to commissioning through negotiation
with providers was seen very clearly in Somerset where,
informed by a lengthy planning process, commissioners
decided to procure the new intermediate level of diabetes
care from the provider of community health services,
rather than primary care provider. This was explained by a
commissioning manager:
‘There was a view that we would test a negotiated
move or resource from secondary care to a community
setting with [trust providing community health services]
being the, the provider because they were the county
wide provider of community services ... there are advan-
tages in having a county wide provider and a county
wide pathway as well.’
Across the sites, the scope for new providers to enter the
market was constrained by the limited supply of suitable
specialist staff (Diabetes Specialist Nurses, for example,
were in short supply nationally). While, in principle, a new
provider could compete for available staff (offering them
more attractive terms), in practice we observed that staff
transfers and secondments became a lengthy part of the
process of negotiation of service redesign. For example,
the Somerset Early Supported Discharge (ESD) service
was delivered by a range of specialist staff: occupational
therapists, physiotherapists and speech and language
therapists employed by the local NHS partnership trust
(providing community health services in this area); specia-
list nurses employed by the acute trusts; and medical con-
sultants from the acute trusts providing clinical oversight.
There was some flow of staff between the partnership and
acute trusts, largely via negotiated secondments. Managers
and clinicians expressed a belief that it was important for
providers, supported by commissioners, to co-operate
rather than compete when it came to drawing on the pool
of local staff in order to avoid disrupting other parts of
provision. As one senior clinician commented when the
ESD service was set up: ‘The danger would be that they
would be robbing the existing stroke specialist services to
start the new service.’
Information
In order for a quasi-market to operate efficiently, Bar-
tlett and Le Grand [7] argue that commissioners and
providers need access to cheap, accurate and indepen-
dent information on cost and quality. This allows provi-
ders to set an appropriate price and purchasers to check
that they are getting a good service. However, across all
six service areas there were substantial challenges in
relation to information, which can be grouped into two
main types. The first was to do with the challenge of
obtaining accurate information on all aspects of services,
from activity data to information on quality and cost, to
use in service redesign, with high expectations of perfor-
mance and monitoring data rarely being met. In the
Somerset ESD service, for example, a consistent theme
of project meetings was the problem of getting accurate
data about the numbers of patients going through ESD,
and the numbers of those potentially eligible. The sec-
ond set of challenges concerned incompatible and out-
dated information systems – including the continued
reliance on paper records in some contexts - preventing
the easy transfer of information between providers and
from providers to commissioners. In Wirral, incompati-
ble data systems meant that commissioners struggled to
extract Read Code data from GP practices on the risk
status of the feet of their diabetic patients. In another
area, inadequate data systems meant that one senior
clinician involved in reviewing a service area described
resorting to going through records by hand:
‘I sat down for a weekend and actually went through
a year’s worth of referrals and counted them up and
showed much higher activity than appears to be
showing on the performance data.... So that’s a major
concern.’
Some examples were positive - the planning for the
Wirral Memory Assessment Service drew on a shared
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PCT/acute trust data warehouse, along with electronic
primary care data; and dementia services were modelled
in detail (initially with the support of the Department of
Health Care Services Efficiency Delivery programme). A
more common story, though, was of a lack of accurate
information about potential demand to inform service
redesign:
‘But this is the biggest handicap within the NHS, is
accuracy and completeness of data. And be able to
look at a number and go, ‘That’s the number.’ And
not look at six different numbers.’
Transaction costs
The scale and intensity of the commissioning work
observed raised questions about whether it was propor-
tionate to the likely impact on the quality and cost of
patient care. Bartlett and Le Grand [7] argue that the
transaction costs of running a quasi-market should be
no higher than any cost savings generated by competi-
tion. As Williamson [3] noted, transaction costs may be
ex ante, that is, incurred in the design and setting up of
a contract, or ex post, that is, incurred in managing a
contract once established.
A considerable proportion of our fieldwork examined
the processes associated with ex ante transaction costs.
In all three sites a considerable amount of labour went
into the developmental aspects of commissioning, both
the building of relationships, and technical tasks such as
needs assessment, evidence review, demand mapping,
writing a business case and service specification, contract
negotiation, and preparation of a performance manage-
ment framework. Across all three sites, the scale of these
tasks combined with a limited supply of skilled commis-
sioning staff meant that commissioners could only give
their attention to a few areas of service provision at any
one time.
Development work and associated ex ante costs were
not exclusively the responsibility of commissioners within
PCTs. For example, the remodelling of the Wirral Mem-
ory Assessment Service was largely driven by a psychiatrist
working for a provider trust, while in Calderdale, staff
from a provider trust did the work of arranging two large-
scale workshops to plan new service models.
Ex post transaction costs were less obvious, mainly
because the research focus was on services in transition
(Additional file 1). However, within the three service
developments – Wirral Memory Assessment Service,
Somerset Diabetes Service, and Somerset Early Sup-
ported Discharge Service – which began operation during
the study, we observed a blurring between ex ante and ex
post transactional processes, over periods of a year or
more. Monitoring of performance and activity levels fed
into the development of a service specification and
contractual arrangements. Constant review of service
delivery helped to revise and refine what was expected of
providers. While commissioners expected that the devel-
opmental work should reduce over time, there was not
always a clear timetable for this; in the meantime, the
cost was significant. Developing the Somerset Early Sup-
ported Discharge Service took the bulk of a PCT middle
manager’s time for the year, with considerable input
from senior colleagues. Monthly project meetings, bi-
monthly care pathway groups, bi-monthly operational
meetings, monthly contract meetings with each provider,
plus one-off workshop and review events, all took up
commissioners’ and providers’ time, as one commissioner
observed:
‘The work involved in writing up papers, doing the
presentations, struggling with putting together a pro-
gramme which just, you just couldn’t see, you know,
even if you could get it off the ground, you couldn’t
replicate it across the county.’
In order to assess whether transaction costs are lower
than any cost savings generated by competition, it is
necessary to know what those cost savings are. However,
an accurate picture of the cost of services was not always
apparent, even in the three new services which were
implemented during the fieldwork period. In all three
cases, a more accurate picture of costs and potential cost
savings was being constructed (supported by nationally
driven mechanisms such as the splitting of payments for
stroke care into smaller components, and a shift towards
activity-based ‘Payment by Results’ in mental health care).
However, in the meantime new service models were
absorbed within large block contracts.
A final difficulty with assessing the cost/savings balance
lay in unpicking what savings might be accruing, to
whom, and when. For example the Somerset ESD service
and Wirral Memory Assessment Service had the potential
to generate long term savings in other health and social
care provision, but were unlikely themselves to be cheaper
to deliver than the services they replaced (in the case of
WMAS, because of an increase in patient numbers, and in
the case of ESD, because of the higher delivery costs of a
peripatetic service). One provider reflected on where cost
savings might accrue:
‘If you take somebody with dementia, clearly they
may well need more intensive acute services sooner
than they would do, particularly because of their co-
morbidities, more social care etc, so the actual saving
isn’t going to be in [our] services necessarily because
Porter et al. BMC Health Services Research 2013, 13(Suppl 1):S2
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we are only a small part of wider services for people
with dementia. It will be in other parts of the
economy.’
Motivation
According to Bartlett and Le Grand [7], providers
should be motivated, at least in part, by financial consid-
erations, and purchasers by the concerns of users.
Although they concede that the reality of the motivation
on each side may be imperfect, underlying Bartlett and
Le Grand’s analysis is the implicit assumption that the
motivations and interests of purchaser and provider are
distinct. However, in the six service areas, it was hard to
discern such a distinction. Part of the reason was that
money featured so little in the commissioning we were
observing, perhaps because the financial aspects of com-
missioning were handled by separate teams from those
dealing with developmental aspects of commissioning,
and often behind closed doors, in negotiations described
by one commissioner as ‘protracted and painful’.
Commissioners and providers appeared to share a
motivation to improve patient care, which was reflected
in all six areas in co-operative working in terms of ser-
vice planning and development, based on positive rela-
tionships at organisational and individual levels. As one
manager from a provider trust observed:
‘I think we’ve always worked together.... [The commis-
sioners] have always asked opinions, they’ve always
sought out our view on service delivery, and they’ve
never come across as being kind of punitive in their
approach to us.’
The same manager also described how the skills and
knowledge of clinicians in particular were valued as a
way to span the interests of providers and commis-
sioners:
‘People... say, “Oh, we can’t have providers in the
room when we’re doing commissioning”. Well, of
course you can and of course you should....So it’s very
much a collaborative, inclusive process that then pro-
duces the model of service and also looks within that
about affordability.’
From the commissioners’ point of view, and to a lesser
extent providers’, much of the motivation to bring about
change came neither from financial concerns nor ser-
ving patients’ interests, but from national policy. Local
commissioners were working to national guidance in
terms of what they should be trying to achieve in long
term conditions management [17,18] and wished to be
seen to be performing well in these terms: delaying the
onset and progression of long term conditions; finding
cost savings and efficiencies; and reducing the need for
unscheduled acute admissions. In addition, for each of
the three long terms conditions, the Department of
Health had produced a National Service Framework or
Strategy [19-21], supported by NICE guidelines and by
more detailed models of good practice. Such guidance
was seen to shape the local performance management
framework, as one commissioner described:
‘We were keen that the outcome measures we looked
at developing for the local CQUIN [a hospital pay-
ment for quality scheme]were things that reflected
the outcome measures in the supplement of the
National Dementia Strategy....So we’re very much
looking at outcome measures that matter to people
rather than just process measures.’
Cream-skimming
In a quasi-market, the use of health care by an indivi-
dual should be related to need. For the quasi-market to
work well, according to Bartlett and Le Grand [7], there
should be no motivation for either providers or purcha-
sers to ‘cream-skim’, that is, to pick and choose patients
and exclude or limit those who are going to be more
expensive to treat.
We found little that could be related directly to the
question of ‘cream-skimming’, reflecting the generally
small role played by money in the discussions we were
observing. Instead, service planning discussions
acknowledged the need to provide services for patients
with different levels of need – particularly in relation to
diabetes care, which followed a tiered model in all three
sites. The difficulty of shifting patients between tiers of
care was a constant theme, especially when it came to
moving lower risk patients away from the care of hospi-
tal specialists. It is most unlikely that this represented
cream-skimming; rather, a combination of professional
reluctance to lose control and patient reluctance to
change a familiar pattern of care.
The difficulty of ‘parcelling’ care for long term conditions
into neat units for quasi-market contracting purposes
Commissioning care in a quasi-market requires a bound-
ary to be drawn around what is to be delivered in return
for the money paid. Particular challenges arise when a
pathway of care is to be delivered by multiple providers, as
is frequently the case with services for people with long
term conditions. The input required by patients is also
likely to be open-ended and unpredictable.
The commissioning work we observed was largely con-
cerned with the remodelling or re-provision of services.
This meant that the necessary first step was to decide the
Porter et al. BMC Health Services Research 2013, 13(Suppl 1):S2
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scope and scale of the commissioning tasks to be under-
taken, even before the boundaries were drawn around
the provision of care. The units of work needed to be big
enough to justify the labour of commissioning and asso-
ciated ex ante transaction costs, whilst not being
unwieldy.
In no case was there a ‘natural’ boundary around the
service being commissioned. The diabetic podiatry ser-
vice in Wirral lay at the intersection of diabetes care and
podiatry – and so was shaped by considerations of bud-
get, policy direction, staffing and management structures
relating to each. The development of the Wirral Memory
Assessment Service was tied to discussions on the
broader strategy for dementia care, including work on
medicines management and outcome indicators. In Som-
erset, although the ESD service itself was relatively clearly
bounded (a time-limited intervention with specific objec-
tives), it was perceived by both commissioners and provi-
ders as part of a bigger picture of provision for stroke
care, with potential to have a positive impact on other
areas of provision, as one clinician suggested:
‘I think that the fact that, you know, consistently we’d
got blockages within the acute Trusts that we hoped
would be relieved by getting Early Supported
Discharge’
In Calderdale, there was an emphasis on ‘transforma-
tion’ of care services, with ambitious ideals for both
dementia and diabetes care, but this had not yet moved
to concrete commissioning developments.
Discussion
In none of the six service areas were all of Bartlett and Le
Grand’s [7] conditions for a well functioning quasi-market
in health care in place. Choice of provider allowing com-
petition to occur was generally absent or limited; informa-
tion on demand and resource requirements was highly
imperfect; motivations were complex; and transaction
costs uncertain, but likely to be high. It was difficult to
divide care into neat units for contracting purposes. As a
result, it is scarcely surprising that the commissioning
practice in relation to all six commissioning developments
was dominated by a relational approach, largely based on
trust and collaboration between commissioners and
incumbent providers. In part, this may be explained by the
persistence of relationships that pre-date the application of
quasi-market principles to services for people with long
term conditions. It also appears to be an adaptive response
to the technical challenges of commissioning services for
people with long term conditions. Both were first shown
in the mid-1990s in the English NHS by Flynn et al
(1996). Subsequent work on commissioner-provider rela-
tionships in the English NHS in the later 1990s and late
2000s has yielded similar findings [22-25] which resonate
with those reported here.
Despite efforts from successive governments to intro-
duce greater supplier competition and more ‘complete’
formal contracts into the system [22,23], non-market
relationships remain strong. Existing relationships and
loyalty play an important part in shaping practice, and
were valued in the current study because the commis-
sioners needed the knowledge (clinical and practical/
operational) of providers in order to support them in
their commissioning role. Hence, commissioners and
providers remain, as Pestsoulas and colleagues put it,
‘mutually interdependent and contracting still relies
heavily on relational networks and service norms’ ([23],
p322). As a result, commissioners were wary of disrupt-
ing existing patterns of provision, and wary of conflict
with providers, and there was very limited sign of com-
missioners threatening incumbent providers by propos-
ing shifts in provision. Consistent with this, Petsoulas
et al [23] show that providers and regulators still
emphasise informal dispute resolution and negotiated
cooperation even in the event of provider-commissioner
conflicts. It seems that both parties respond paradoxi-
cally to pressure for more market-like behaviour with
more socially embedded forms of contracting to main-
tain the functioning of the quasi-market in financially
difficult times, a phenomenon predicted by Polanyi [26].
Although it can be argued on theoretical grounds that
better constructed, legally enforceable contracts could
help health care commissioners to exert greater influ-
ence with, and over, providers [27], the technical con-
straints faced in stimulating a market in this area and
contracting for care, plus the costs of operating such a
system, suggest that other factors are possibly more
important [28]. While contracts can help to define the
boundaries of a unit of provision (what Macneil [29]
called discreteness), these boundaries were hard to pin
down in the current study. Services remained intrinsi-
cally difficult to ‘commodify’ [30,31] (e.g. for competitive
tendering).
The ‘relational’ aspects of commissioning and contract-
ing, as compared with the ‘transactional’ element of for-
mal contracting, appear to be ways of managing and to
some extent overcoming these difficulties. Relational
aspects include trust, common values, and networks,
whether established or new [32-35]. The emphasis on
relational contracting in our data may have been exagger-
ated by the fact that any use of the more transactional
mechanisms to engender change seemed to take place
elsewhere in the PCTs, outside the commissioning meet-
ings associated with particular service areas (most likely
in contract negotiations led by senior finance personnel
and commissioning directors which the study was not
able to observe). However, this divorcing of the more
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relational (service review, design and development)
aspects of commissioning from the transactional aspects
(contracting and performance monitoring) within the
local practice of commissioning, is of note in itself since
it calls into question how far the NHS quasi-market
operates as a market in the way that policy makers may
have intended, or whether elements from the ‘cycle of
commissioning’ are applied in a manner that helps clini-
cians and managers to shape services for the future.
Our research focused exclusively on the commission-
ing of care for people with long-term conditions, so it is
impossible to know whether all of the commissioning in
the three PCTs functioned in the same manner. In ser-
vices for people with long-term conditions, however, it
appears that local managers and clinicians had devel-
oped and/or retained relational approaches to commis-
sioning that draw together multiple providers to develop
and plan new forms of more or less ‘integrated’ care.
International experience in planning and funding care
for people with long-term conditions confirms the need to
consider different approaches to contracting for acute and
long term condition care which engender co-operation
across organisations and services and reflect the way in
which patients experience care. For example, there have
been experiments in commissioning ‘chains of care’ in
Sweden [36]. In New Zealand, experimental ‘alliance con-
tracting’ shares risk and gains between all providers and
commissioners, on a basis of trust and shared outcomes
[37], while in the USA ‘accountable care organisations’[38]
take a similar approach.
In England, there has been some experimentation with
new forms of commissioning care for people with long-
term conditions, as commissioners draw together a
range of providers into a single contractual agreement
where gains and risks are shared. Examples include the
cardiovascular service for the people of Knowsley [39]
and the Connected Care pilots supported by the charity
Turning Point [40].
However, such approaches are challenging for NHS
commissioners in that they run counter to the efforts of
Government policy makers to encourage more market-
like behaviour. Arguably, successive pro-market reforms of
the NHS from the 1990s have tended to downplay or even
ignore the possibility that services for people with long
term conditions might need to be commissioned and pro-
vided differently from, for example, elective surgery [41].
In the three PCTs, conventional distinctions between
the roles of commissioners and providers were often
blurred as they worked together to redesign models of
care. Clinicians and managers from provider organisa-
tions played a significant, and sometimes leading, role in
needs identification, service planning and negotiating
shifts of care between hospitals, primary care and com-
munity health providers. This behaviour is consistent
with the official definition of ‘commissioning’ as
opposed to ‘purchasing’ promoted by the Department of
Health [8] which emphasises working closely with
providers.
Conclusions
This study reveals how and why the relational aspects of
commissioning have remained predominant in the Eng-
lish NHS, at least in the local commissioning of care for
people with long-term conditions. Our findings show
the seemingly adaptive persistence of relational commis-
sioning based on networks of interdependence and trust
between commissioners and providers, and the difficul-
ties faced by local commissioners in developing market
relationships based on purchaser-provider contracting.
This relational approach to commissioning challenges
the simple notion of a quasi-market and can, instead, be
seen as an understandable strategy of local commis-
sioners faced with securing services that require the
coordination of multiple providers, where skilled clinical
staff are scarce and in the absence of good information
on outputs, quality or costs.
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